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Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both
about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision-
makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such
committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like
to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision
has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world.
Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g.,
by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will
organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the
paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market
Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence
supporting the two propositions.
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1 Introduction
Many important decisions are made by groups or committees. Compared
to individual decision-making, committee decision-making benets from
the possibility of information exchange and discussion before a decision is
reached. It is particularly useful if the matter at hand is complicated. If
such is the case, decision-making typically requires considerable expertise,
and is delegated to experts. A plausible assumption is that such experts
are interested both in the matter at hand and in their reputation, i.e.,
their level of competence as perceived by the principal. Delegation of deci-
sion power often goes accompanied by the request to explain the decision
reached. This request may stem from the desire to hold the committee and
its members accountable for the decision. In this paper, we address two
questions. What information does the decision-making committee volun-
tarily provide to support the adequacy of its decision? And how does the
committee react to outside pressure to provide more information? In the
next section, we provide answers to these questions. Section 3 discusses
the case of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee. We conclude by
discussing some related literature.
2 Analysis
On behalf of the public, a committee has to make a binary decision: im-
plement a project, X = 1, or maintain the status quo, X = 0. By nor-
malization, status quo delivers a payo¤ equal to zero. If the project is
implemented, the project payo¤ to each member (and the public) equals
p + . The parameter p is the ex ante expected payo¤ from implementa-
tion. The stochastic term  2 f h; hg, with Pr ( = h) = 1=2, expresses
that the state of the economy, and therefore the e¤ect of implementation,
is uncertain. We assume that the socially optimal decision depends on ,
so p  h < 0 < p+ h.
Each member comes to the meeting with a view on . If a member
is competent, his view is awless. If he is incompetent, it is uninfor-
mative. A member only knows that he is competent with a probability
. It is also the a priori belief the public holds about a members level
of expertise. Members exchange their views on . Next they vote on the
project, and some voting rule then determines the nal decision. All this
happens behind closed doors. The decision becomes known to the public.
Finally, the committee decides what information to make public. We as-
sume that a member i cares both about the value of the project and about
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his reputation, Ui (X = 1) = p+ + i^ (
1) and Ui (X = 0) = i^ (
0).
Here, ^ (
X) denotes the updated belief of a members competence after
the public observes X given the available information, and i > 0 is the
weight member i attaches to his reputation.
The following result follows.
Proposition 1 Committee members speak with one voice.
Once a decision on the project has been reached, the expected value of the
project is determined. So, any further information members voluntarily
provide to the public is meant to strengthen their reputation. First assume
that when updating its belief about a members competence, the public
does not know the true state of the economy. In that case, disagreement
signals lack of competence, as competent members view the consequences
of the project in the same way. Consequently, once the decision has been
taken, all members - whether their private analyses support or contradict
the nal decision - show a united front to the outside world in support of
this decision. Now assume that when updating its belief about a mem-
bers competence, the public has observed the true state of the economy.
Under this assumption, each agent wants the public to believe that he
had a correct private view. In the meeting, the agents have learnt each
other views. Consequently, they can assess which view is most likely to
be correct. When deciding what information to make public, each agent
adopts this view. Therefore, again, all members speak with one voice. No-
tice that under both assumptions, the public learns very little about the
deliberation that took place. As a result, it is impossible to hold members
accountable individually.
Another implication of decision making behind closed doors is that rep-
utational concerns may lead the committee to distort the decision on X.
To understand why, suppose that from a social point of view project im-
plementation requires that the views of all members indicate that  = h.
Furthermore suppose that the public does not learn . As discussed above,
committee members want to conceal disagreement and hence speak with
one voice. In the present case, an additional way of concealing disagree-
ment is choosing X = 1, as this option requires agreement while X = 0
may result from disagreement. Thus, by choosing X = 1 the committee
pretends agreement. More generally, reputational concerns give incentives
to committee members to opt for the decision that requires concurrence of
views. Of course, distorting the implementation decision is costly. Hence,
committee members are willing to do so only if reputational concerns are
su¢ ciently strong.
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To remedy a situation where decisions are possibly distorted and it is
hard to hold members accountable, the public may call for more trans-
parency. Suppose it imposes that deliberation takes place in public rather
than in private. At rst sight, this improves matters greatly. The pub-
lic can now directly observe what each member says. Moreover, members
have an interest to tell what they really think when deliberating. After all,
if one member thinks circumstances are favourable, than it is more likely
that the majority of the other members agrees rather than disagrees with
this member. So, telling the truth is best from a reputational point of
view as it gives rise to a higher degree of concurrence. That is, requiring
transparency gives the public the best chance of evaluating an individ-
ual members level of competence. But members of the committee will
feel exposed, as perceived levels of competence are lower if members hold
di¤ering opinions than if such di¤erences are absent. So, if they could
somehow circumvent this exposure, they would prefer that. Organizing a
pre-meeting is a costless means to reach that goal. All deliberation can
shift to the pre-meeting, members can speak their minds, take the socially
desirable decision, and then go the formal, transparent, meeting where
they show full support for the decision reached. In the end, accountability
has not improved.
Proposition 2 Demands for transparency to increase accountability are
understandable, but lead to the emergence of pre-meetings.
In the next section, we present a case study that provides suggestive evi-
dence supporting both propositions.
3 A Case Study: The U.S. Federal Open Market
Committee
Propositions on closed meetings and pre-meetings are hard to test as, by
denition, much information on the way decisions are reached remains hid-
den. However, Meade and Stasavage (forthcoming; MS from here onwards)
point to an interesting exception. Before 1993, meetings of the U.S. Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) were closed. More precisely, most
members of the FOMC knew that these meetings were tape-recorded but
were unaware that the tapes were kept. So, before 1993, FOMC mem-
bers believed that their meetings were closed. Starting in the fall of 1992,
the FOMC came under pressure of Congress to become more transparent.
In particular, Congress requested it to provide a detailed account of the
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discussion taken place. After strong opposition, the FOMC decided to
release lightly-edited, but otherwise verbatim transcripts of the meetings
with a ve year delay. Moreover, transcripts of meetings before 1993 were
made available. This decision can be regarded as a (small) step towards a
transparent decision-making process.
Recently, Meade (2005) has developed a unique data set of the 72
FOMC meetings during the period 1989-1997. This set contains codes of
voiced preferences and formal votes of individual FOMC members. This
data set is especially interesting, because it covers the years before and
after the regime shift of 1993. In this section, we examine to what extent
the behavior of members in the FOMC ts our two predictions for the
1989-1997 period.
At the outset, we would like to emphasize that the FOMC case devi-
ates from the set up presented above in at least two important respects.
First, in our model the committee members are equal. In the FOMC,
however, the Chairman is by far the most important member. The dom-
inance of Greenspan, for example, was so strong that it was sometimes
di¢ cult to distinguish between the FOMC and Greenspan.1 In our opin-
ion, this does not mean that reputational concerns have not played a
role under Greenspan. Below, we present anecdotal evidence that it was
Greenspan who strongly pressed for unanimity and consensus. Moreover,
it was Greenspan who often took the initiative for one-to-one pre-meetings.
One possible interpretation of all this is that Greenspan wants "his FOMC"
to be considered an outstanding committee. Second, in 1993 the FOMC
decided to release verbatim transcripts of its meetings with a ve year
delay. Clearly, this is only a small step towards opening the deliberation
stage in the FOMC meetings. In the previous section, however, the delib-
eration stage in the formal meeting is either closed or open. It is therefore
quite likely that our analysis overestimates the consequences of the regime
shift in 1993.
Anecdotal Evidence
Recently, two books by former Fed Governors have been published. Blinder
(2004) wrote a book on how central banking has changed over the past 15
years.2 Meyer (2004) wrote a book in which he provides an insiders view of
the Fed. Both books contain much information relevant for an evaluation
of our two main predictions.
1Blinder (2005, p. 11) mentions the Greenspan Fed as an example of a situation where
it is hard to tell whether a given central bank uses group or individual decisionmaking.
2We also draw on Blinder (2005).
5
Do FOMC members conceal disagreements? Blinder (2004, p. 26)
calls the FOMC collegial. In such a committee, he argues, individual
members are expected to fall in line behind the groups decision. The
Chairman plays an important role in building a consensus: ... the desire
to maintain the appearance of unity will sometimes force even a dominant
chairman to tack in either the hawkish or dovish direction in order to keep
wavering committee members on board(Blinder, 2005, p. 58-59, emphasis
in original). Meyer (2004, p. 52), who never dissented during his term as
a Governor, also mentions a norm of conforming to the majority: Once
the majority view (...) is apparent at FOMC meetings, the Committee is
expected to rally around it.
Has transparency led to pre-meetings in the FOMC case? A hint to
the answer to this question is Greenspans response to the pressure from
Congress that the FOMC should become more transparent. He argued
that in a meeting members need to feel free to trade ideas, question as-
sumptions, advance hypotheses, make projections, speculate on alternative
policies and possible outcomes, and especially to change their views in re-
sponse to the arguments of others. He felt that such would no longer
be possible if Congress had its way. He conjectured that the request of
Congress would induce an important change: [a] tendency would arise for
one-on-one pre-meeting discussions, with public meetings merely announc-
ing already agreed-upon positions or each participant to enter the meeting
with a nal position not subject to the views of others (Greenspan, as
quoted in MS, pp. 18-19).
Did the pre-meetings actually take place? Meyer (2004, p. 50) leaves
no doubt that they did: To ensure that he (Greenspan) has the votes to
support his policy recommendation, the Chairman visits with the members
of the Board in advance of FOMC meetings. The nature of the pre-
meetings has changed over time: After a while, the Chairman abandoned
the private talks before the FOMC meetings and instead used the Monday
Board meeting (the day before the FOMC meeting) to share with us his
views on the outlook and indicate where he was leaning with respect to
policy. Unlike the FOMC meeting the next day, the discussions at the
Monday Board meeting did not consist of prepackaged presentations. They
were a much truer give-and-take, a serious exchange of ideas, with each
of us questioning one another along the way. In his book, Blinder does
not explicitly write about pre-meetings. However, his remark about the
statement that accompanies a monetary policy decision is enlightening:
Toward the end of Greenspans chairmanship, candidate drafts of the
statement were vetted by FOMC members prior to the meeting(Blinder,
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2005, footnote 19).3
All in all, there exists anecdotal evidence suggesting that (i) there was
a tendency to conformism in the FOMC; (ii) during Meyers term as a
Governor (1996-2002) pre-meetings were held; (iii) in both (i) and (ii), the
Chairman played an essential role.
Data on Vote Dissents and Voice Dissents
Let us now examine whether our predictions are consistent with the dataset
composed by Ellen Meade (2005). This set contains codes of voiced policy
preferences and formal votes of individual FOMC members, drawn from
the transcripts and voting records of the 72 FOMC meetings during the
period 1989-1997.4 To examine the e¤ects of the regime change in 1993, we
follow MS by considering two sub-periods, one before 1993 and the other
after 1993.5 The dataset thus covers four years (1989-1992, 32 meetings,
see Table 1) in which members were under the (wrong) impression that
their deliberations were secret and four years (1994-1997, 32 meetings) in
which they realized that their remarks would be made public in the course
of time.
Do we observe in this dataset a tendency to conceal disagreement?
Table 1 reports 48 vote dissents in 64 meetings.6 This seems to be a small
number. More importantly, the number of voice dissenting opinions is
higher (75). Thus, when members of the FOMC verbally dissent from the
Chairmans proposal, sometimes they do not subsequently dissent in the
o¢ cial vote. This may indicate that committee members indeed conceal
disagreements.
Does the regime shift in 1993 change the nature of the debate in the
FOMC meetings as predicted? Table 1 shows that while dissenting views
in the policy go-around were already infrequent before 1993 (48 on a total
of 325 opinions), they became very rare in later years. This is especially
3Another illuminating quote from Meyer (2005, p. 236, footnote 11): I am told that
the presentations used to be more spontaneous and interactive. But this changed once
the decision was taken to release the transcripts after ve years. Committee members
apparently want to make sure that their remarks, when read ve years later, will be
coherent and graceful. So most would write them down and read them. I quickly fell
into the practice of doing the same.
4The data le is on http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/past/2005/.
See Meade (2005) for a description.
5The observations for 1993 are excluded, because it is hard to determine at which
meeting members knew that the debate in the FOMC would become public.
6Henry Chappell et al. (2005, p. 11) report that just 7.8 percent of all votes during
the 1966-1996 period were dissenting.
7
true for the Governors of the Board, who almost always presented a united
front with the Chairman after 1993. There was also a sharp decrease in the
number of members again, Governors in particular that voiced dissent
but supported the Chairmans Funds rate proposal when it came to voting
(reported as Inconsistent voice dissentsin Table 1). The following quote
from Meyer (2004, p. 51) points to an explanation for the di¤erence in
behaviour between Governors and Presidents: Reserve Bank Presidents
are not part of the pre-meeting discussions at the Board. So, we see a
convergence of speech and voting behaviour after 1993. This observation
is in line with the anecdotal evidence that after 1993 Board members held
pre-meetings.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of FOMC meetings over 1989-1992 and 1994-19971
Number of: 1989-1992 1994-1997 % change
Meetings 32 32 0
Number of voice and votes 325 320 -2
Vote dissents 35 13 -63
of which Governors 16 2 -88
Voice dissents 48 27 -44
of which Governors 17 5 -71
Inconsistent voice dissents2 27 16 -41
of which Governors 9 3 -67
Meetings having three or more voice dissents 9 4 -56
Meetings having three or more vote dissents 4 0 -100
1 Numbers of dissents refer to voting members only. Chappell et al. (2005, p. 111)
nd that "...nonvoting alternates have no appreciable inuence over policy out-
comes".
2 Members who voiced dissent but formally voted in favour of the Chairmans
interest rate proposal.
Possible Caveats
The above ndings are clearly consistent with the propositions. An al-
ternative explanation for the di¤erences in voice and vote dissents between
the two sub-periods is that monetary policy became less complicated, less
controversial or less special after 1993. It seems reasonable to assume that
the more volatile is the environment, the more complicated is the conduct
of monetary policy. However, we believe that the environment was more
volatile after 1993 than before 1993. One way of measuring the volatility
of the environment is by examining for each FOMC meeting whether the
decision on rate and bias was in line with the bias adopted at the previous
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meeting.7 If not, we regard the economic conditions at the time of the
current meeting as special. This is either a meeting at which an asym-
metric bias adopted at the previous meeting was discontinued without a
rate change, or a meeting at which a rate change was not preceded by an
asymmetric bias. There were eight such meetings in the second sub-period
and just ve in the rst. This suggests that there is no reason to assume
that monetary policy has become less complicated after 1993.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have only looked at the way a committee of experts inter-
acts with its public. Levy (2007), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), Swank
and Visser (2007), and Visser and Swank (2007) analyse group dynam-
ics inside such committees. As noted above, MS also analyse the FOMC
data. They, however, view the change in deliberation after 1993 as stem-
ming from changes in the incentives to herd. There is no denying that
FOMC meetings under Greenspan followed a particular order, and that
Greenspan was the rst to state his prefered decision. It follows from MS,
that if the inclination to herd were the main consideration, transparency
would strengthen membersincentives to herd. As a result, one would ex-
pect to observe less, not more pre-prepared statements after 1993. MS (p.
4) note, however, that since 1993 there has been an increased tendency
for committee members to present the sort of pre-prepared statements that
may result in less real deliberation. To the best of our knowledge, Swank
and Visser (2007) is the rst paper that focuses on pre-meetings. It analy-
ses what dealscan be struck in unstructured pre-meetings, which ones will
be endorsed in the formal meeting, and how these deals may be di¤erent
from what the public desires. Roberts (2006) discusses various other ways
in which governmental bodies have adapted to demands for more trans-
parency as formulated in Freedom of Information Acts, including formal
challenges through changes in record-keeping to outright failure to create
records.
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